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SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
Matter of Tanya p.97
(printed February 28, 1995)
Tanya P. asserted that Bellevue Hospital's petition, made
pursuant to section 9.13(b) of the Mental Hygiene Law, 9 8
requesting her involuntary confinement on the grounds that she
posed a danger to her unborn fetus, infringed upon her federal
and state constitutional rights to due process 9 9 and equal
protection. 10 0 In a case of first impression, the New York
97. N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 26 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
98. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13(b) (McKinney 1996). This
subsection states in pertinent part:
If such voluntary patient gives notice in writing to the director of the
patient's desire to leave the hospital, the director shall promptly release
the patient; provided, however, that if there are reasonable grounds for
belief that the patient may be in need of involuntary care and treatment,
the director may retain the patient for a period not to exceed seventytwo hours from receipt of such notice. Before the expiration of such
seventy-two hour period, the director shall either release the patient or
apply to the supreme court or the county court ...for an order
authorizing the involuntary retention of such patient.
Id.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision states in pertinent part:
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 states in
pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." Id.
100. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 27. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. This provision states in pertinent part: "No State shall.., deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11. This provision states in pertinent part: "No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof." Id.
Additionally, Tanya P. asserted that the language of section 9.13 of Article
IX of the Mental Hygiene Law contains no express provision allowing
involuntary retention based on fetal endangerment. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb.
28, 1995, at 27. The language of § 9.13 requires that the person the state seeks
to commit be mentally ill and in need of involuntary treatment. Id. However,
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Supreme Court, with an extremely well-reasoned opinion, denied
the petition.10 1
The Tanya P. court held that the involuntary retention of Tanya
P. on the grounds of fetal endangerment violated the statute "for
failure to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence,
and because such involuntary commitment would violate [Tanya

P.'s] constitutional right to liberty." 102 The court respectfully
found that "[a] woman's pregnancy cannot support limitations
upon her liberty on fetal endangerment grounds based on the
entirely inadequate medical evidence presently available." 10 3 In
addition, the court determined that discrimination based upon a
woman's pregnancy is a violation of the woman's constitutional
right to equal protection under the New York State
Constitution. 104
On April 9, 1993, a petition was brought pursuant to Mental
Hygiene Law section 9.13(b) 105 by Bellevue Hospital to
involuntarily retain Tanya P. on the grounds that if she were
released, she would pose a threat to the safety of her unborn
child. 106 Two months before the petition was filed, Tanya had
become a patient at Bellevue in order to receive treatment for a
the court stated that based on several federal and state decisions, § 9.13
requires a showing that the person is a potential threat to herself or other
persons by clear and convincing evidence. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28,
1995, at 27 (citing O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975)).
See Scopes v. Shah, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (3d Dep't
1977) (holding that due process "requires that the continued confinement of an
individual must be based upon a finding that the person to be committed poses
a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others"). In addition,
the court found that, "absent specific legislative inclusion of fetal protection, a
fetus can have no 'rights' imputed to it and cannot be the object of the state's
protection under Article IX of the Mental Hygiene Law." Tanya P., N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 27. Thus, the court agreed with Tanya P. and held that
section 9.13 "does not permit involuntary retention of a person for purposes of
protecting the welfare of a fetus." Id.
101. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.13(b).
106. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 26.
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mental illness. 107 Tanya received treatment during those months,
which ended her hallucinations and resolved her psychosis. 108
However, Bellevue sought to keep her retained as a patient at the
hospital and filed the petition during her eighth month of
pregnancy.

109

Affidavits were submitted by two doctors in support of the
petition for Tanya's retention. 110 At a hearing, one of the doctors
testified, giving three reasons why Tanya should be involuntarily
retained. 111 First, the doctor testified that Tanya's "impulsivity"
and past addiction to crack would result in her continued use of
1 12
drugs upon release from Bellevue, thus damaging her fetus.
Second, Tanya would be a great threat to her unborn child
because of her "aggressive rule-breaking behavior" and her
"inability to defer gratification stemming from her antisocial
personality." 113 Third, Tanya's disposition and lifestyle before
she was admitted to the hospital, particularly "living on the
streets," posed a risk to her fetus because she would likely be
involved in altercations with other people which would result in
injury. 1 14 However, the doctor acknowledged on crossexamination that fetal endangerment resulting from cocaine use
was speculative and unsupported by conclusive medical
evidence. 115
In evaluating Tanya P.'s claim that involuntary retention
violated her substantive due process rights, the court found that
retention on the grounds of fetal endangerment infringed upon
her "liberty interest in freedom of movement, 116 freedom of
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The doctor stated that "[w]e don't have any conviction that she
wouldn't be using crack five minutes after she left the hospital." Id.at 27.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The United States Supreme Court has stated that involuntary
confinement to a mental institution is a "massive curtailment of liberty."
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). In Humphrey, the petitioner
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reproductive
treatment."

118

choice, 117

and

freedom

to

refuse

medical

The court stated that since the retention infringed

upon these fundamental rights of privacy and liberty, the policy
had to withstand strict scrutiny to avoid violating substantive due
process. 119 Thus, the hospital was required to demonstrate that
challenged the constitutionality of a statute providing a procedure for the
involuntary commitment of sex offenders. Id. at 506. The Court, deciding that
an evidentiary hearing was necessary, remanded the case back to the district
court. Id.
117. "'[L]iberty' also includes the fundamental right to privacy in matters
such as bodily autonomy and reproductive choice." Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb.
28, 1995, at 27. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding
modified by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992). InRoe, an unmarried pregnant woman residing in Texas
sought an abortion. Id. at 120. However, she was unable to obtain a legal
abortion in Texas due to state statutes that made it a crime to perform an
abortion unless it was necessary to save the mother's life. Id. She filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of the criminal abortion statutes, alleging that
the statutes infringed upon her right to privacy as guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The Supreme Court
held that the Texas criminal abortion statutes' ban on abortions unless needed
to save the mother's life, without considering the stage of the woman's
pregnancy, violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id. at
164.
118. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29. The New York Court of
Appeals has stated that bodily autonomy encompasses being able to choose and
"control the course of [one's] medical treatment." Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d
485, 492, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986). In Rivers,
involuntarily retained mental patients filed suit "to enjoin the nonconsensual
administration of antipsychotic drugs and to obtain a declaration of
their... constitutional right to refuse medication." Id. at 490-91, 495 N.E.2d
at 339-40, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77. The court of appeals held that "the due
process clause of the New York State Constitution affords involuntarily
committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsychotic
medication." Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The court
also declared that the right was not absolute and could be overcome by a
compelling interest asserted on behalf of the State. Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at
343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
119. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 28. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155
(stating that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved... regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake") (citations omitted); Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at
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the retention "serves a compelling [state] interest, and that the
120
policy is narrowly tailored to achieve its goals."
In evaluating whether the fetal endangerment policy furthered a
compelling state interest, the court established that the hospital
was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent represented "a real and present threat of substantial
harm to [her]self or others." ' 12 1 However, the court determined

that the "others" did not include an unborn child, and that a fetus
"cannot be the object of the state's protection under Article IX of
the Mental Hygiene Law."

122

Thus, the court stated that "absent

a legislative declaration that a fetus is a person, neither the state
nor the federal constitution 'confer[s] or require[s] legal
personality for the unborn.' 123 The court concluded that it was
not the intent of the legislature to include unborn children under
495-97, 495 N.E.2d at 342-44, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81 (stating that where a
fundamental right is at issue restrictions based upon a compelling state interest
must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).
120. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 28.
121. Id. (citing Scopes v. Shah, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911,
913 (3d Dep't 1977)). In Scopes, the petitioner was involuntarily retained on
the grounds that he was mentally ill, required treatment and was unable to
"realize the necessity for that treatment." Id. at 204-05, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 91213. The appellate division held that in order to justify involuntary retention of
a patient, it must be shown that the individual poses a danger to himself or
others; it is not enough that the sole grounds for "such deprivation of liberty is
the provision of some treatment." Id. at 205, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
122. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 27.
123. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Byrn v. New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 203, 286 N.E.2d 887, 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390,
395 (1972)). In Byrn, the issue was "whether children in embryo are and must
be recognized as legal persons or entities entitled under the State and Federal
Constitutions to a right to life." Byrn, 31 N.Y.2d at 199, 286 N.E.2d at 888,
335 N.Y.S.2d at 392. The court of appeals stated that "unborn children have
never been recognized as persons in the law in the whole sense." Id. at 200,
286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392. It also determined that "[t]he
Constitution does not confer or require legal personality for the unborn." Id. at
203, 286 N.E.2d at 890, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 395. Additionally, the Tanya P.
court noted that the United States Supreme Court has declared that "'the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."'
Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 27 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 162 (1973)).
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this section of the Mental Hygiene Law. 124 Alternatively, the
court asserted that even if a fetus was encompassed in the Mental
Hygiene Law's definition of "others," the "courts do not compel
one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her
bodily integrity for the benefit of another person's health." 125
Additionally, the court stated that "[i]f the fetus likely would, or
even might survive without involuntary confinement of the
pregnant woman, there is no 'compelling' interest." 126
Furthermore, the court found that the medical evidence presently
available relating crack or cocaine use to fetal endangerment was
speculative and thus not sufficient to justify involuntary
retention. 127 Therefore, the court concluded that the State did not
have a compelling interest to justify retention of Tanya P. on the
basis of fetal endangerment. 12 8
The court next turned to the question of whether the hospital
had established that involuntary retention was narrowly tailored
to fulfill the state's goal of preventing fetal endangerment in
mentally ill, substance abusing pregnant women. 129 In the instant
case, the court found that the respondent's conduct clearly
reflected her eagerness to obtain pre-natal care, the respondent's
family had and would continue to provide her with affection and
would continue to support her, and the medical evidence
presented by petitioner was not conclusive in showing adverse
effects upon a fetus by a pregnant woman's use of crack or
cocaine. 130 Accordingly, the court determined that the
124. Id.
125. Id. at 28 (quoting In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-44 (D.C. 1990)).

In A. C., doctors asserted that a terminally ill, pregnant woman's fetus would
have a reduced survival rate unless a caesarean section was performed. In re
A.C., 573 A.2d at 1239. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
held that the right of an individual to accept or forego medical treatment
requires that "in virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be
decided by the patient-the pregnant woman-on behalf of herself and the fetus."
Id. at 1237.

126. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 28.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Id.
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circumstances in the instant case "demonstrate that involuntary
commitment is, at best, only loosely related to any state interest
in preserving potential human life." 13 1 Further, the court noted
that "since prenatal care is the single most important factor in
healthy babies born to substance abusers, the fear of involuntary
commitment by a woman seeking such treatment may well deter
her from precisely what is most needed and which best serves the
state's interest." 132 Thus, involuntary retention "is not only
insufficiently tailored, it is also directly contra-indicated."133 As
a result, the court determined that involuntary commitment based
on potential danger to the fetus failed strict scrutiny. 134
In addition, the court established that the involuntary retention
of mentally ill, substance abusing pregnant women who do not
pose a threat to themselves or other people, and who would not
be retained if they were not pregnant, implicates the equal
protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. 135
The court found that the involuntary retention policy had not
withstood strict scrutiny as applied to the deprivation of a
person's liberty. 13 6 The court further asserted that, assuming
strict scrutiny was not applicable, the involuntary retention at
issue in this case discriminated on the basis of pregnancy. 137
Although noting that in Geduldig v. Aiello, 138 the "Supreme
Court has held that discrimination based on pregnancy is not
gender-based discrimination for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment,"' 139 the court found the reasoning of Justice

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.

138. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the appellees challenged the
constitutionality of a section of California's disability insurance program which
excluded coverage of disabilities occurring as a result of pregnancy. Id. at 486.
The Court held that the program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 497.
139. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29.
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Brennan's dissent in Geduldig more persuasive. 140 In Geduldig,

Justice Brennan stated that "dissimilar treatment of men and
women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably

14 1
linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination."
The court in Tanya P. then stated that "New York courts are not
bound by [the majority opinion of Geduldig] in determining the

extent of protection under our State Constitution Equal Protection
Clause." 142
In the absence of a state court decision directly ruling on the
issue, the court referred to Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York
State Human Rights Appeal Board,143 where the New York
Court of Appeals, "in construing provisions of our state's Human
Rights Law... held that pregnancy based discrimination is
gender based discrimination." 144 The court stated that based on
the reasoning of the court of appeals in Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
and the dissent in Geduldig, the applicable test for pregnancy
based discrimination under the New York State Constitution is

akin to intermediate scrutiny, and that "the state bears the burden

140. Id.
141. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29. See People v. P.J. Video,
Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911
(1986) (stating that "[a]lIthough State courts may not circumscribe rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret their own law to
supplement or expand them"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
143. 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976).
144. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29. The court of appeals in
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. recognized that two years after Geduldig, the
Supreme Court, in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), had
interpreted Title VII's ban on gender based discrimination not to include
pregnancy based discrimination. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 41 N.Y.2d at 86
n.1, 359 N.E.2d at 395 n.1, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 886 n.1. The court of appeals,
however, found the Supreme Court's decision "instructive, [but] not binding"
in reading New York Executive Law section 296 as prohibiting pregnancy
based discrimination. Id. at 386, 391 n.1, 359 N.E.2d at 395, 398 n.1, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 886, 889-90 n.1. In addition, the Tanya P. court noted that this
interpretation of Title VII by the Supreme Court was reversed when Congress
enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb.
28, 1995, at 29 n.47.
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of showing an important governmental interest and means closely
tailored to effectuate that interest."145
The court noted that involuntary retention, based on fetal
endangerment, had failed strict scrutiny because the fit was not
tight enough to further the State objective. 146 As a result, the
court concluded that the involuntary retention did not withstand
intermediate scrutiny either. 147 The court stated that "[t]he means
chosen [are]

. .

. 'actually perverse'" to that objective. 148 Thus,

the court determined that involuntary confinement violated Tanya
P.'s equal protection rights because it constituted impermissible
14 9
gender based discrimination.
The court applied the strict scrutiny test to determine if Tanya
P.'s liberty interests under the Federal and New York State
Constitutions had been violated, 150 and intermediate scrutiny to
determine if her right to equal protection had been violated under
the New York State Constitution. 151 Although the court
acknowledged the majority decision of the Supreme Court in
Geduldig with respect to equal protection, the court made it clear
that New York may expand the protection afforded under the
Federal Constitution. 152 In doing so, the Tanya P. court chose to
follow Justice Brennan's dissent in Geduldig. Furthermore, the
court noted that Congress included discrimination based on
pregnancy in Title VII's ban on discrimination based on sex when
it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.153 Thus, in
accordance with the reasoning of Justice Brennan's dissent, the
New York Court of Appeals in Brooklyn Union Gas Co., and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the court found that
gender discrimination included pregnancy based discrimination

145. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29.
146. Id.

147. Id.
148. Id.

149. Id.
150. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
152. Tanya P., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 29.
153. Id. at 26 n.47.
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and, as such, was prohibited. 154 As a matter of constitutional
law, Tanya P. points out that the New York Equal Protection
Clause goes further than the Federal Equal Protection Clause, in
that it deems discrimination based on pregnancy gender
discrimination, thus subjecting it to review under intermediate
scrutiny.

RENSSELAER COUNTY
Jubic v. City of Troy City Corporation
(decided October 4, 1995)

55

Plaintiff, an applicant to become a municipal firefighter, passed
an open competitive examination for the position prior to
reaching the age of thirty-five, however, he was not offered the
position until after turning age thirty-five. 15 6 Plaintiff brought an
action against the municipality seeking an order stating that he
had been denied his right to equal protection under the New York
State157 and Federal Constitutions 158 when the municipality
refused to hire him. 159 The Supreme Court, Rensselaer County,
held that defendants' requirement, that firefighter applicants be
under the age of thirty-five in order to take the open competitive
examination, was not violative of the Federal Constitution or the

154. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
155. 166 Misc. 2d 326, 633 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County
1995).
156. Id. at 328, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
157. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state

or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.

158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
159. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 328, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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